Environmental Policy and Firm Selection in the Open Economy by Kreickemeier, Udo & Richter, Philipp M.
 
 
ISSN  2510-1196 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CEPIE Working Paper No. 04/19 
Center of Public and International Economics  
 
 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY  
AND FIRM SELECTION  
IN THE OPEN ECONOMY 
 
 
June 2019 
 
 
 
Udo Kreickemeier 
Philipp M. Richter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Editors: Faculty of Business and Economics, Technische Universität Dresden. 
This paper is published on the Open Access Repository Qucosa. 
The complete Working Paper Series can be found at the CEPIE Homepage | EconStor | RePEc 
Environmental Policy and Firm Selection
in the Open Economy
Udo Kreickemeier†
University of Göttingen, CESifo, GEP
Philipp M. Richter‡
TU Dresden, CESifo, DIW Berlin, KCG
June 2019
Abstract
In this paper, we analyse the effects of a unilateral change in an emissions tax in
a model of international trade with heterogeneous firms. We find a positive effect
of tighter environmental policy on average productivity in the reforming country
through reallocation of labour towards exporting firms. Domestic aggregate emis-
sions fall, due to both a scale and a technique effect, but we show that the reduction
in emissions following the tax increase is smaller than in autarky. Moreover, general
equilibrium effects through changes in the foreign wage rate lead to a reduction in
foreign emissions and, hence, to negative emissions leakage in case of transboundary
pollution.
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1 Introduction
The effectiveness of unilateral environmental policy in a globalised world remains a key question
for research and policy-makers alike. Unilateralism is a common theme in global climate policy,
for instance. It is an imminent feature of the Paris (Climate) Agreement, where countries
individually decide on greenhouse gas emissions reductions, the so-called nationally determined
contributions (cf. UNFCCC, 2015). Key concerns address both a potential negative impact on
domestic manufacturing and a poor environmental effectiveness due to carbon leakage.1 Both
concerns impede the implementation of ambitious policies to begin with.
We address these issues focusing on effects at the firm level, where we highlight the role of
firm behaviour in case of firm heterogeneity in productivity and emissions intensity. The main
question we are interested in is the effect of a change in the domestic emissions tax rate on
aggregate emissions at home and abroad. In particular, we analyse how the impact on domestic
emissions is altered by the fact that the economy is open and show how this is related to a
change in the distribution of active firms.
To this end, we develop a general equilibrium trade model with heterogeneous firms à la
Melitz (2003), to which we add an emissions-generating process based on Copeland and Taylor
(1994). Accordingly, each active firm endogenously determines how much labour to employ in
production, and how much to use for abatement. Countries are asymmetric, as in Felbermayr
et al. (2013), and in reaction to a unilateral change in the emissions tax the firm distribution,
the labour allocation across firms and within each firm across usage, and the tax-wage ratios in
both countries endogenously adjust in general equilibrium. Jointly, these effects determine the
change in domestic and foreign emissions. The model remains analytically tractable, and we
provide closed-form solutions for all relevant elasticities.
We show that in the presence of international trade in goods a unilateral increase in the
emissions tax raises the economy-wide average productivity in the reforming country. The least
productive firms stop producing, while resources are shifted to exporting firms, which are both
more productive and less emissions intensive than the average of domestic firms. This shift to-
wards exporting activity is due to a decline in the relative market size of the reforming country
induced by the tax increase. With its focus on an induced rise in productivity due to the general
equilibrium across-firms reallocation of resources, our model gives an alternative rationale for
1 See Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) on the empirical relevance of shifts in the carbon content of trade flows due
to climate policies initiated by the Kyoto Protocol. In a structural gravity model, Larch and Wanner (2017)
show how carbon tariffs could reduce carbon leakage.
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the Porter Hypothesis (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995), observed at an aggregate level.2 We
show that this mechanism crucially depends on both international trade and asymmetric envi-
ronmental policy changes, as in our model framework it is neither present under autarky nor in
the case of internationally coordinated environmental policy.
We further show that the reallocation of labour towards exporting firms is complemented
by a within-firm reallocation of labour towards emissions abatement. The resulting decline
in aggregate emissions is due to both a scale effect and a technique effect, i.e. the economy
develops towards a state of lower overall production, which is on average cleaner. Importantly,
the direct effect of higher emissions pricing is amplified by an induced decline in the wage
rate. This mechanism holds both under autarky and in the open economy. However, we show
that aggregate emissions are less elastic with respect to changes in the emissions tax when the
economy is open. The reason is a smaller decline in the demand for labour in production due
to the opportunity to export leading to the across-firms reallocation of labour towards the more
productive exporters.
Moreover, we find that the reduction in the market size of the reforming country induced by
the more stringent environmental policy transmits to its trading partner, and we show that via
general equilibrium adjustments foreign aggregate emissions decrease as well. In case of trans-
boundary pollution this environmentally beneficial effect feeds back to the reforming country.
All other things equal, environmental effectiveness rises due to this channel of negative emissions
leakage. Our result of negative emissions leakage relies on a general equilibrium effect on the
tax-wage ratio in the foreign country induced by the decline in the relative market size of its
trading partner, the reforming country. The foreign wage falls relative to the unchanged foreign
emissions tax, inducing a reallocation of labour towards abatement in the foreign country.
This channel is different from, and complementary to, other rationales for negative emissions
leakage that have been put forward in the literature. In Baylis et al. (2014) the mobility of a
clean input (e.g. labour or capital) across countries leads to the decline in foreign production
and, hence, foreign emissions. Other frameworks generate negative emissions leakage through
international spillovers of green technologies (cf. Di Maria andWerf, 2008) or endogenous changes
in the foreign environmental policy (cf. Copeland and Taylor, 2005).3 In a small open economy
(within an intra-industry trade model with homogeneous firms) Holladay et al. (2018) highlight
2 According to the (’strong version’ of the) Porter Hypothesis stricter environmental policy may push regulated
firms to a more profitable state as it triggers innovation, for instance, and individual firms become more pro-
ductive. Ambec et al. (2013) provides a recent survey of the theoretical explanations and the empirical evidence
on the Porter Hypothesis.
3 See Baylis et al. (2014) for a broader discussion on how to decompose the overall leakage effect into partial
effects in computational general equilibrium (CGE) models.
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the role of trade costs in a non-polluting sector (“services”) for emissions leakage. For a services
importer, higher trade costs in this sector increase emissions leakage, partly by dampening
an effect of negative emissions leakage from reduced domestic consumption of the polluting
good. Also in a monopolistic competition trade model with homogeneous firms Gürtzgen and
Rauscher (2000) derive a channel of negative leakage by allowing for endogenous markups and
linking emissions to the number of firms. A change in the domestic emission standard alters the
market-structure and may lead to reduced foreign emissions.
Our paper contributes to a literature that analyses the effect of (trade and environmental)
policy changes on environmental quality in open economies, focusing on the micro level and
accounting for firms’ heterogeneous responses.4 Kreickemeier and Richter (2014) show how
unilateral trade liberalisation may affect aggregate emissions, even in the absence of emissions
pricing, through the reallocation of resources across firms that differ in emissions intensities.
Forslid et al. (2018) develop a model in which firms can decide on how much to invest in order
to reduce their emissions intensity. An exporting firm with larger sales can more easily spread the
investment costs across supplied volumes and invest more. A reduction in trade costs increases
the difference in emissions intensity to non-exporting firms due to changes in relative sales.
LaPlue (2019) develops a two-sector model with firm heterogeneity extending Bernard et al.
(2007), in which one sector is polluting and countries differ in their relative factor endowments
of labour and capital. He then focuses on intra-sectoral and inter-sectoral composition effects of
trade liberalisation on aggregate emissions, and shows how these effects interact.5 In contrast
to all these papers, which focus on the effects of trade policy changes on the environment, we
analyse in this paper the effects of a unilateral change in environmental policy. Two types of
reallocation effects interact in the adjustment to the change in the emissions tax rate: a within-
firm reallocation of resources between the production process and emissions abatement, and the
across-firms reallocation of labour towards exporters. Both reallocation effects can be viewed
as micro-foundations of the technique effect that subsumes (trade and environmental) policy
induced changes in aggregate emissions intensities.6
Our paper is also related to the literature on the impact of environmental regulation in
4 For a recent survey see Cherniwchan et al. (2017).
5 Barrows and Ollivier (2018) develop a model with multi-product firms, where emissions-intensities differ across
products within each firm. Changes in (trade) policy affect aggregate emissions through the heterogeneous
reaction of firms in altering their product mix’. In the model of Forslid et al. (2017), which abstracts from
differences between firms, it is the interaction between relative country size and relative emissions taxes that
matters for firm location and emissions. Despite higher environmental standards, a large country may attract
polluting firms due to the home market effect, while global emissions decline in this case. The model of Pflüger
(2001) is based on a similar mechanism.
6 The technique effect is found to play an important role in changes in aggregate emissions (cf. Shapiro and Walker,
2018; Cherniwchan, 2017; Levinson, 2009; Antweiler et al., 2001).
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closed-economy models with heterogeneous firms. It is a potential loss in varieties (i.e. a net
reduction of supplying firms) that Andersen (2018) characterises as indirect welfare costs of reg-
ulation. Anouliès (2017) and Konishi and Tarui (2015) analyse the environmental and economic
effects of an emissions trading scheme (ETS) with different forms of allocation rules. Tombe and
Winter (2015) and Li and Sun (2015), in turn, derive differences between taxes and standards,
while Cao et al. (2016) and Andersen (2016) focus on investments in abatement technology.
Najjar and Cherniwchan (2018) distinguish between two upgrade options; one that only reduces
the emissions intensity and another that additionally leads to an increase in labour productivity
at higher fixed costs. In line with a recent Canadian environmental policy reform, only firms
without any of the two options are affected, which induces selection and reallocation effects.
In this paper we complement this literature by focussing on the effects of environmental policy
in an economy open to international trade. We show how both the exchange of manufactured
goods and emissions spillovers influence the effectiveness of domestic policy changes when het-
erogeneous firms in both trading countries adjust. Asymmetry in environmental policy reforms
turns out to be decisive.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and
analyses the effects of an environmental policy reform under autarky. Section 3 extends the
model to the open economy case with asymmetric countries, while Section 4 solves for the
impact of a unilateral change in environmental policy on firm selection and aggregate emissions
in both trading countries. Section 5 provides additional results on a coordinated environmental
policy reform and presents a decomposition of aggregate emissions. Section 6 concludes.
2 Environmental policy reform in the closed economy
We consider an economy that is endowed with L units of labour and that produces two types
of goods, a homogeneous final good and a differentiated intermediate good. Emissions E are
generated in the production process of the intermediate good.
2.1 The model: basics
The final good is produced under perfect competition from all available varieties of the inter-
mediate good (cf. Egger and Kreickemeier, 2009; Ethier, 1982). Production of the final good is
represented by a standard CES production function with σ > 1 as the elasticity of substitution
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between varieties. Accordingly,
Y =
[∫
v∈V
q(v)
σ−1
σ dv
] σ
σ−1
,
where q(v) denotes the demand for variety v out of the set of all available varieties V . Profit
maximisation leads to the standard iso-elastic demand function q(v) = Y P σp(v)−σ for each
variety, where p(v) is the price of variety v and P denotes the ideal CES price index.7 We use
the homogeneous final good as numéraire. In the intermediate goods sector, there is a continuum
of firms of different productivity levels, with each firm producing a unique variety. Production
generates emissions. Firms can use labour, l, both in their production process and in order to
abate emissions, e. An individual firm’s production technology is given by y(ϕ) = ϕξ(ϕ)l(ϕ),
with ϕ as the exogenous productivity level that characterises a particular firm and ξ(ϕ) as the
endogenous share of variable labour input that is used in production.
We follow Copeland and Taylor (1994) and assume that firm-level emissions are given by
e(ϕ) =
[
ξ(ϕ)
] 1
1−α l(ϕ), (1)
with α ∈ (0; 1). Hence, emissions are increasing and convex in ξ(ϕ), and therefore the abatement
technology exhibits a decreasing marginal efficiency with respect to the labour share used in
abatement, 1 − ξ(ϕ). Using Eq. (1) to substitute for ξ(ϕ), we can re-write the production
technology as
y(ϕ) = ϕ
[
l(ϕ)
]α [
e(ϕ)
]1−α
,
where parameter α is the cost share of production labour in the production process. Accordingly,
our specification is equivalent to treating emissions as an input into the production process.8
Treating parametrically the competitive wage rate w and the emissions tax t per unit of
generated emissions, firms minimize their unit production cost, yielding factor demand functions
l(ϕ) = y(ϕ)
ϕ
(
t
w
)1−α ( α
1− α
)1−α
and e(ϕ) = y(ϕ)
ϕ
(
w
t
)α (1− α
α
)α
, (2)
7 We assume that households spend their entire income on the domestically produced final good, i.e. PiYi. Income
originates from labour income and revenues from an emissions tax that are lump-sum redistributed to households.
In the open economy setup below, total income is increased by potential tariff revenues, which are lump-sum
redistributed to households as well.
8 See Copeland and Taylor (1994) or Copeland and Taylor (2004) for a motivation of this specific form of abate-
ment.
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and a unit cost function
c(ϕ) = βw
αt1−α
ϕ
, with β ≡ (1− α)(α−1)α−α.
Both factor demand functions depend on the wage-tax ratio facing the firm. Despite the apparent
symmetry in the role played by w and t, there is an important difference, in that the wage rate
is an endogenous variable determined in general equilibrium, while the tax rate is a policy
parameter.
Using Eq. (1), the share of variable labour input used for production follows as
ξ =
(1− α
α
)1−α (w
t
)1−α
, (3)
which shows that the firm-internal allocation of labour is independent of firm productivity.
Plausibly, a lower emissions tax relative to the wage rate leads to a larger employment share
being allocated to production rather than abatement. The firm-specific emission intensity is
defined as a(ϕ) ≡ e(ϕ)/y(ϕ), and substituting from above we find
a(ϕ) =
(1− α
α
)α (w
t
)α
ϕ−1. (4)
The emission intensity is decreasing in ϕ, i.e. a more productive firm is more environmentally
efficient, and increasing in the wage-tax ratio.
Firms compete under monopolistic competition. Selling a unique variety, each firm can
charge a constant markup ρ−1 ≡ σ/(σ − 1) over its unit cost: p(ϕ) = c(ϕ)/ρ. Imposing goods
market equilibrium, it follows that firm-level prices p(ϕ) are decreasing in firm productivity
ϕ with elasticity −1, while firm-level output y(ϕ) and firm-level revenues r(ϕ) are increasing
in ϕ with elasticities σ and σ − 1, respectively. Firm-level emission intensities and firm-level
emissions also vary with firm productivity with constant elasticity. Specifically, for two firms
with productivities ϕ1 and ϕ2, we have
ei(ϕ1)
ei(ϕ2)
=
(
ϕ1
ϕ2
)σ−1
and ai(ϕ1)
ai(ϕ2)
=
(
ϕ1
ϕ2
)−1
.
Hence, a more productive firm generates more emissions (due to its larger output) but has a
lower emission intensity.9
9 This matches well recent empirical findings at the firm-level (cf. Forslid et al., 2018; Richter and Schiersch, 2017;
Holladay, 2016).
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Due to fixed-markup pricing, firm-level operating profits are a constant fraction 1/σ of firm-
level revenues. With a fixed input requirement equal to f units of labour, this implies that the
productivity of the marginal firm, denoted by ϕd, is implicitly determined by the zero cutoff profit
condition π(ϕd) = r(ϕd)/σ−wf = 0. The productivity of final-good producers is drawn from a
Pareto distribution G(ϕ) = 1−ϕ−k with corresponding density function g(ϕ) = kϕ−(k+1), where
we assume k > σ in order to ensure that the relevant model variables have finite means. With a
Pareto distribution for productivities, average revenues are a constant multiple θ ≡ k/[k−(σ−1)]
of the revenues for the marginal firm, and therefore the zero cutoff profit condition implies that
average profits of active firms are equal to
π̄ = (θ − 1)wf. (5)
Access to the productivity draw is costly, as in Melitz (2003), with fixed entry cost equal
to wfe. In equilibrium, the fixed entry cost is equal to the expected profits to be made in the
market, which are given by average profits of active firms, π̄, multiplied by the probability of
getting a draw above the cutoff productivity ϕd, which is equal to 1−G(ϕd). Using the Pareto
assumption, the free entry condition can be written as
π̄ = wfe(ϕd)k. (6)
Together, Eqs. (5) and (6) imply
ϕd =
[
(θ − 1)f
fe
] 1
k
(7)
and, hence, cutoff productivity ϕd only depends on model parameters σ, k, f , and fe.
2.2 Aggregate emissions
The main question we are interested in is the effect of a change in the domestic emissions tax
rate on aggregate emissions. Below, we will compare this effect to the effect that arises in an
economy open to international trade. Total emissions generated in autarky are given by
E = Mē, (8)
i.e. they are the product of the mass of firms and the average emissions per firm. We can derive
the mass of firms M from the full employment condition, according to which exogenous labour
supply L needs to be equal to the labour demand for the fixed-cost activities plus variable labour
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demand for production and abatement:
L = M1−G(ϕd)f
e +Mf +Ml̄, (9)
where M/[1 − G(ϕd)] > M is the mass of firms entering the productivity lottery, while l̄ ≡∫∞
ϕd l(ϕ)g(ϕ)/[1−G(ϕd)]dϕ is average variable labour input, where we use density-weights from
the ex post equilibrium productivity distribution of active firms. As we show in the Appendix,
the mass of active firms follows as
M = L
ζkfe
(
ϕd
)−k
, (10)
where we define ζ ≡
[
1 + α(σ − 1)
]
/(σ − 1). Average emissions, in turn, are given by
ē =
∫ ∞
ϕd
e(ϕ) g(ϕ)1−G(ϕd)dϕ = (1− α)θ(σ − 1)f
w
t
, (11)
which directly follows from the zero profit condition of the marginal firm and from the Pareto
specification of the productivity distribution.
Using Eqs. (10) and (11), aggregate emissions can be derived as
E = (1− α)L(θ − 1)f
ζfe
w
t
(
ϕd
)−k
= (1− α)L
ζ
w
t
, (12)
where the second equality follows from Eq. (7). Accordingly, aggregate emissions solely depend
on the wage-tax ratio. Intuitively, it is the wage-tax ratio that determines the economy-wide
labour allocation between the production process and emissions abatement and that is, hence,
crucial for the total economic activity and the aggregate emissions intensity.10
In order to derive the reaction of aggregate emissions to a change in environmental policy
we express terms in percentage changes. In the open economy setting below, this technique
of log-linearising non-linear relations is needed to find closed-form solutions, and for reasons of
comparability it is employed here as well. Log-linearising aggregate emissions, Eq. (12), yields
Ê = ŵ − t̂,
where the hat-notation denotes a percentage change, e.g. Ê ≡ dE/E. As shown in the Appendix,
in the closed economy the elasticity of the wage rate w.r.t. the domestic emissions tax is given
10 We devote part of Section 5 to a discussion on the decomposition of aggregate emissions.
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by
ŵ
t̂
= −1− α
α
, (13)
and hence an increase in the emissions tax leads to a reduction in the wage rate that is larger
in absolute value if α, the cost share of production labour, is small. It follows directly that
Ê/t̂ = −1/α < −1. We therefore have the following result:
Proposition 1. An increase in the emissions tax reduces aggregate emissions in the closed
economy. The direct effect of the tax increase is amplified by an induced reduction in the wage
rate, which gives a further incentive to reduce emission intensity at the firm level.
3 Open economy equilibrium
We now characterise the open economy equilibrium, allowing for asymmetry between two large
countries, where we denote the home country of Section 2 by i and the foreign country by j,
respectively. In the following we focus on country i, while results equivalently hold for country j.
While we assume the final good non-tradable, we allow for (costly) trade in the differentiated
intermediate good.11 Besides international trade, countries are linked by potential emissions
spillovers of transboundary pollution. Accordingly, the effect of a unilateral environmental
policy reform on domestic pollution may be different in the open economy than in the setting
of autarky for two reasons. First, due to international trade the domestic economy and, hence,
domestic aggregate emissions may respond differently to a change in the emissions tax rate.
Second, trade in intermediates transmits the change in country i’s emissions tax to the foreign
country affecting foreign aggregate emissions, which spill over to the reforming country in case
of transboundary pollution.
3.1 The intermediate goods sector
In the intermediate goods sector, each active firm decides whether to become an exporter given
two types of export costs. First, there is a fixed input requirement of fx units of labour, where we
assume f̃x ≡ fx/f ≥ 1. Second, exports are subject to an ad-valorem tariff (τj−1) ≥ 0 imposed
by the importing country. Accordingly, domestic exporters charge a price of pj(ϕ) = τjci(ϕ)/ρ
11 Suppose, for instance, the final good production process is a refinement for the particular market or, alterna-
tively, a form of retailing. We continue using the domestic CES-composite final good as numéraire. We show in
an Online Appendix that our results remain valid if we choose the foreign final good as the numéraire instead.
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on the foreign market. Export revenues of a domestic firm with productivity ϕ then follow as
rxi (ϕ) = τ−1j
Yj (Pj)σ
(
τjβw
α
i t
1−α
i
ρϕ
)1−σ .
The zero cutoff profit conditions for entry in the domestic and export markets are given by
rdi (ϕdi )
σ
− wif = 0 and
rxi (ϕxi )
σ
− wifx = 0, (14)
respectively, where ϕxi denotes the productivity of the marginal exporting firm.
Due to the assumption of a Pareto distribution for productivities, the share of exporters in
the total mass of active firms, χi, can be expressed in terms of the two cutoff productivities:
χi =
1−G(ϕxi )
1−G(ϕdi )
=
(
ϕdi
ϕxi
)k
(15)
In analogy to the closed economy, the zero cutoff profit conditions now allow us to write average
profits across all domestic firms from both the domestic and the export market as
π̄i = (θ − 1)wi (f + fxχi) . (16)
Together with the unchanged free entry condition, Eq. (6), the zero cutoff profit conditions imply
the following relation between the two cutoff productivity levels in country i:
f(ϕdi )−k + fx(ϕxi )−k =
fe
θ − 1 . (17)
Accordingly, in the open economy the two productivity cutoffs for the domestic and for the
export market, respectively, are negatively related. The intuition is straightforward: The free
entry condition implies that for given market entry cost a higher domestic cutoff – and hence a
lower probability of getting a productivity draw above this cutoff – must be accompanied with
a higher expected profit in case of a successful draw, i.e. a higher π̄i. Higher expected profits in
turn require a higher share of firms that export, and therefore, for a given domestic productivity
cutoff, a lower export productivity cutoff.
Finally, the balanced trade condition in our model can be written as
χiMir̄
x
i = χjMj r̄xj , (18)
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where χiMi is the mass of exporting firms in country i and χjMj in country j, respectively.
Using the zero cutoff profit conditions, Eq. (14), the share of exporting firms in our model can
be written as
χi =
[
τ−σj
(
f̃x
)−1 YjP σj
YiP σi
] k
σ−1
. (19)
It depends both on trade-related parameters, the foreign tariff and the relative size of fixed
exporting costs to domestic production fixed costs, and on ratios of aggregate variables, i.e. the
relative price index and relative aggregate income between the two countries. For instance, a
larger size of the foreign economy leads to an increase in the share of exporters among domestic
firms, ceteris paribus. We assume throughout that trade costs are sufficiently high relative to
the size of the export market such that exporting is not chosen by all firms, i.e. χi is strictly
smaller than one.
3.2 Aggregate emissions
Similar to Eq. (12) for the closed economy, we can derive aggregate emissions in country i as
Ei = Mi
(
ēdi + χiēxi
)
, (20)
where ēdi denote average emissions from domestically sold production and ēxi average emissions
from supplying the foreign country.
As in the closed economy case, it is straightforward to derive the mass of firms from the
full employment condition. Relative to labour demand in the closed economy setting, as given
in Eq. (9), in the open economy labour demand additionally originates from exporting activity:
to comply with the fixed input requirements and to be employed in the production process
and the abatement of emissions. Additional labour demand is thus given by χiMi(fx + l̄xi ),
where l̄xi ≡
∫∞
ϕxi
yxi (ϕ)/(ϕξi)g(ϕ)/[1 − G(ϕxi )]dϕ denotes average variable labour demand from
export supply. As shown in the Appendix, it turns out that the closed economy result still
holds and the mass of domestic firms is given by Eq. (10). However, the domestic productivity
cutoff it depends on, possibly is different when country i is open to international trade. Average
emissions, in turn, are determined as
ēdi = (1− α) θ(σ − 1)f
(
wi
ti
)
and ēxi = (1− α) θ(σ − 1)fx
(
wi
ti
)
, (21)
where we weigh firm emissions, from Eq. (2), by means of the ex post equilibrium distributions
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of domestic firms, g(ϕ)/[1−G(ϕdi )]dϕ and of exporting firms, g(ϕ)/[1−G(ϕxi )]dϕ, respectively.
Eqs. (17), (20) and (21) imply that aggregate emissions of country i are given by
Ei = (1− α)
Li(θ − 1)
ζfe
wi
ti
[
f
(
ϕdi
)−k
+ fx
(
ϕxi
)−k]
= (1− α)Li
ζ
wi
ti
. (22)
Hence, we have the following result:
Lemma 1. Aggregate domestic emissions in the open economy depend solely on model param-
eters and on the wage-tax ratio.
4 Unilateral environmental policy reform
In this section, we analyse the effects of a unilateral increase in the emissions tax of country i
when it is open to international trade. We thereby focus on the impact on environmental quality
and on the variables environmental quality depends on, in particular cutoff productivities and
the wage rates in the two countries.
As we show in the Appendix, by combining the equilibrium conditions from Section 3 we
can characterise the open economy equilibrium by a system of six equations in the four cutoff
productivity levels (two for each country) and the two wage rates. Due to non-linearities, we
follow Felbermayr et al. (2013) and Kreickemeier and Richter (2014) and log-linearise the system
of equations, which allows us to find closed-form solutions in percentage-change notation. The
resulting system of six equations in the six unknowns ϕ̂di , ϕ̂xi , ϕ̂dj , ϕ̂xj , ŵi, and ŵj is given by:
ϕ̂di = −f̃xχiϕ̂xi (23)
ϕ̂dj = −f̃xχjϕ̂xj (24)
ϕ̂xj = ϕ̂di − ζ
(
ŵi − ŵj
)
− (1− α)t̂i (25)
ϕ̂xi = ϕ̂dj + ζ
(
ŵi − ŵj
)
+ (1− α)t̂i (26)
ϕ̂xi = ϕ̂xj +
1
k
(
ŵi − ŵj
)
(27)
0 = δ̃i
[
αŵi + (1− α)t̂i +
k − (σ − 1)
σ − 1 ϕ̂
d
i
]
+
(
1− δ̃i
) [
αŵj +
k − (σ − 1)
σ − 1 ϕ̂
x
j
]
, (28)
where we have set P̂i = 0 by choice of the numéraire and t̂j = τ̂i = τ̂j = 0 by choice of
our analysis in this section,12 and where we define δ̃i as the expenditure share of domestically
12 In the Appendix we present the log-linearised system of equations in general form.
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produced varieties in total expenditures of country i. It is determined as
δ̃i ≡
Mir̄
d
i
Mir̄di + τiχjMj r̄xj
=
(
1 + τif̃xχi
)−1
(29)
where the second equality follows from the trade balance condition and equilibrium solutions of
the mass of firms, Mi, and average revenues, r̄di = θσwif and r̄xi = θσwifx. In the absence of
an import tariff (τi = 1), the expenditure share δ̃i coincides with the revenue share of domestic
sales in total sales in country i. With positive tariffs, however, domestic consumers pay more
for imports than foreign exporting firms generate as revenues. From Eq. (23) it follows that
δ̃i is related to the elasticity between the two domestic cutoff productivity levels as ϕ̂di /ϕ̂xi =
−τ−1i (1 − δ̃i)/δ̃i. Accordingly, if the (initial) expenditure share for domestic products is large,
for instance due to low initial trade openness, this elasticity is small (in absolute terms).13
4.1 Firm selection
Let us first focus on firm selection in response to the environmental policy reform. To this
end we solve the system of equations for the change in the domestic cutoff productivity levels
w.r.t. a unilateral change in the domestic emissions tax. As shown in the Appendix, the effect
of a change in ti on the export cutoff in country i is given by
ϕ̂xi
t̂i
= −(1− α)
(
1 + f̃xχj
)
(Ak)−1 < 0, (30)
where we define A ≡
[
2 + f̃x
(
χi + χj
)]
ζ −
[
1−
(
f̃x
)2
χiχj
]
k−1 > 0. Accordingly, a unilateral
increase in the domestic emissions tax leads to a reduction in the domestic export cutoff produc-
tivity. The elasticity is largest (in absolute value) for small values of the cost share of labour, α,
and of the (initial) domestic share of exporters, χi, while it is decreasing in the (initial) share
of foreign exporting firms, χj . Using relation Eq. (23), the effect on the marginal domestic
productivity level follows as
ϕ̂di
t̂i
= (1− α)f̃xχi
(
1 + f̃xχj
)
(Ak)−1 > 0, (31)
which is strictly positive and smaller than unity but declining in α and increasing in χi,j . For
χi → 0 the elasticity converges to zero and we are back in the case of autarky as discussed in
13 Note that allowing for asymmetry this elasticity can generally be as small as −f̃x ≤ −1, while it is restricted
to minus one in case of symmetry. This is because χi can be large despite high trade costs, which happens if
the foreign economy is large relative to the domestic one.
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Section 2.
Jointly, the change in the two domestic productivity cutoffs leads to an ex ante ambiguous
effect on the aggregate economy-wide productivity. On the one hand, the marginal domestic
firm is now more productive, on the other hand, however, firms of lower productivity now use
resources for exporting activity. Let us define aggregate productivity as the weighted harmonic
mean of individual firm productivity levels taking into account relative output volumes.14 Ac-
cordingly,
ϕ̄i ≡
[∫ ∞
ϕdi
ϕ−1
ydi (ϕ) + yxi (ϕ)
ȳi
g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕdi )
dϕ
]−1
= k − (σ − 1)
k − σ
1 + f̃xχ
k−1
k
i
1 + f̃xχi
ϕdi , (32)
where we use the ex post equilibrium productivity distribution of all active domestic firms
throughout and, thus, calculate the average productivity based on the entire (active) firm pop-
ulation. According to Eq. (32), average productivity is not affected by the wage-tax ratio but
determined by firm selection, which is reflected by the presence of both cutoff productivity levels.
Log-linearising and simplifying, as shown in the Appendix, yields
ˆ̄ϕi
t̂i
= (k − 1)
 1− χ1/ki
f̃xχi + χ1/ki
 ϕ̂di
t̂i
> 0. (33)
These results are summarised as follows:
Proposition 2. A unilateral increase in the emissions tax by country i reduces the productivity
of the marginal exporter in country i, while it increases the productivity of the marginal producer
as well as aggregate country-i productivity.
The positive effect of a tax increase on aggregate productivity in our model works exclusively
through a composition effect due to the reallocation of labour to more productive firms. The
productivity at the firm level is fixed by assumption, as in many models in the tradition of
Melitz (2003). Hence, our model puts forward as an alternative to the Porter Hypothesis (cf.
Porter and Van der Linde, 1995), which focuses on induced technological adjustment at the level
of individual firms, as an explanation for this positive link between environmental regulation
and productivity at the aggregate level. Our finding is also related to Qiu et al. (2018), who
find a similar result in a closed economy with linear demand. Interestingly, in our model with
14 Precisely, ϕi is the average productivity of labour that is used in the production process. Alternatively, one
can define the average labour productivity more broadly as the average productivity of entire variable labour
input, which yields ξi×ϕi, or using the entire labour supply as in Demidova and Rodríguez-Clare (2009) which
yields Miqi/Li. Note further that ϕi is differently defined than the (sales-weighted) average productivity in
Melitz (2003). The following result is valid for all these different measures of aggregate productivity.
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CES demand aggregate productivity is unaffected by environmental taxes if the economy is
closed. As a consequence, our analysis throws into particularly sharp relief the role played by
international trade, with the reallocation of labour from small domestic firms to large exporting
firms providing the crucial link between environmental taxation and aggregate productivity.
In order to get an intuition for why the tax increase induces the reallocation of labour to
exporting firms, we log-linearise Eq. (15) to get
χ̂i
t̂i
= k
(
ϕ̂di
t̂i
− ϕ̂
x
i
t̂i
)
> 0,
where the positive sign directly follows from Proposition 2. The share of domestic exporters
rises, leading to the increase in average productivity. Now, recall from Eq. (19) that χi changes
in the relative market size of both trading partners. Without a change in trade costs this implies
that
Ŷi + σP̂i
t̂i
<
Ŷj + σP̂j
t̂i
.
It is, hence, the increase of the effective relative size of the export market induced by the domestic
tax increase that drives firm selection and the increase in domestic average productivity.
The opposite happens in the foreign country. The decline in relative market size of the
country increasing the tax rate – which is the export market for the foreign country – lead
to fewer exporters, and to firm entry at the lower end of the productivity distribution. With
derivations deferred to the Appendix, we find
ϕ̂xj
t̂i
= − 1 + f̃
xχi
1 + f̃xχj
ϕ̂xi
t̂i
> 0 and
ϕ̂dj
t̂i
= − f̃
xχj
f̃xχi
1 + f̃xχi
1 + f̃xχj
ϕ̂di
t̂i
< 0, (34)
where in case of initial symmetry, the effects on the two foreign cutoffs are of the exact same
size (in absolute values), but of different sign, than the effects on the two cutoffs of country i.
Inferring from Eq (33), the changes in the cutoff productivity levels imply that the foreign
average productivity decreases when the domestic emissions tax is unilaterally raised.
We summarise this result as follows:
Proposition 3. A unilateral increase in the emissions tax by country i has a negative impact
on aggregate productivity in the foreign country. The marginal productivity of producing firms
in country j decreases, while the marginal exporter’s productivity increases.
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4.2 Environmental quality
4.2.1 Change in domestic emissions
We know from Eq. (22) that the impact of a unilateral increase in the domestic emissions tax
on aggregate emissions solely depends on the change in the wage-tax ratio according to
Êi
t̂i
= ŵi
t̂i
− 1, (35)
where, however, it is ex ante unclear how the wage rate is affected in the setting of international
trade. In general equilibrium, there are different opposing partial effects that interact: from
decisions at the level of the individual firm on labour allocation across usages and, additionally
to the closed economy setting, through firm selection and the reallocation of labour to more
productive firms.
As shown in the Appendix, the link between the endogenous change in the domestic wage
rate and the exogenous change in the domestic emissions tax in the open economy can be written
as
ŵi
t̂i
= −1− α
α
1− 1 + f̃xχjAk
f̃xχi + k
σ − 1
{
1− 1 + f̃
xχi
1 + τif̃xχi
}
 < 0, (36)
where the term in parentheses is strictly between zero and one. Hence, the overall effect is
negative, but smaller in absolute terms than in the closed economy. Intuitively, the decline
in the domestic wage rate induced by the unilateral increase in the domestic emissions tax is
cushioned in the open economy through the option of exporting to country j, whose relative
market size is increasing.
Lemma 2. A unilateral increase in the emissions tax by country i reduces the (real) wage rate
in country i. The effect is smaller in absolute value than in the closed economy.
From Lemmas 1 and 2, it jointly follows that a unilateral increase in the domestic emissions
tax rate indeed reduces domestic emissions, taking into account all general equilibrium effects
in the open economy. The decline in the domestic wage rate amplifies the emissions reduction
from tightened environmental policy. This can be summarised as follows:
Proposition 4. A unilateral increase in the emissions tax by country i leads to a decline in
domestic aggregate emissions. This effect is less pronounced in the open economy than under
autarky.
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4.2.2 Emissions spillovers and domestic environmental quality
Environmental quality in country i does not only depend on domestic emissions, but – in case
of transboundary pollution on foreign emissions as well. For this reasons we now look at the
question of how an increase in the domestic emissions tax affects foreign emissions, Ej .
Since Eq. (22) holds analogously for country j, we have
Êj
t̂i
= ŵj
t̂i
, (37)
i.e. foreign emissions are affected by the change in the domestic emissions tax via the latter’s
effect on the foreign wage rate. As shown in the Appendix, it is straightforward to derive the
elasticity of the relative wage rate w.r.t. the domestic emissions tax as
ŵj − ŵi
t̂i
= (1− α)
[
2 + f̃x
(
χi + χj
)]
A
> 0. (38)
Hence, an increase in the domestic emissions tax rate leads to a rise in the relative foreign wage
rate.
Substituting for ŵi/t̂i from Eq. (36), we get 0 > ŵj/t̂i > ŵi/t̂i, where the derivation is
deferred to the Appendix. We can summarise these findings as follows:
Lemma 3. A unilateral increase in the emissions tax by country i leads to a reduction in the
foreign wage rate. This reduction is smaller than the decline in the wage rate of reforming
country i.
According to Eq. (37), the reduction in the foreign wage rate translates into a proportional
reduction of foreign emissions, and therefore our model features negative emissions leakage. It
is the consequence of the fact that with a declining foreign wage rate and an unchanged foreign
emissions tax rate the tax-wage ratio – and with it the incentive for abatement at the firm level
– increases in the foreign country. If the pollutant is transboundary, this positive environmental
effect feeds back to the reforming country, and domestic pollution is unambiguously decreasing
in the domestic emissions tax.
In the effort to compare the effectiveness of an increase in the emissions tax for reducing
domestic pollution we now have identified two effects that work in opposite directions: on the
one hand, domestic emissions are reduced more strongly by an increase in the emissions tax if the
economy is not open to international trade. On the other hand, with international trade there
is an induced reduction in foreign emissions, and therefore an additional reduction of domestic
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pollution in the presence of international pollution spillovers.
In order to see what can be said about the overall effect, we specify pollution in country i
as the linear function Di ≡ Ei + γEj , where parameter γ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the degree of spillover
of emissions across national borders. Accordingly, the case of a purely local pollutant is given
by γ = 0, while γ = 1 denotes the case of a global pollutant. Deriving the elasticity of domestic
pollution, Di, w.r.t. the domestic emissions tax then yields
D̂i
t̂i
= Ei
Ei + γEj
Êi
t̂i
+ γEj
Ei + γEj
Êj
t̂i
,
where changes in aggregate emissions of each country are weighted by initial shares in country
i’s pollution. Using Eqs. (35), (37), and (38) this can be rewritten as
D̂i
t̂i
= ŵi
t̂i
− Ei
Ei + γEj
+ γEj
Ei + γEj
(1− α)
[
2 + f̃x
(
χi + χj
)]
A
, (39)
which we have to compare to the corresponding expression in autarky, D̂/t̂ = Ê/t̂ = ŵ/t̂− 1.
From Lemma 2 we know that ŵi/t̂i is larger in the closed economy. Further, as it is a share,
the second term in Eq. (39) cannot exceed unity, while the third term is positive (although
declining in the initial trade openness, see above). Jointly, it directly follows that the elasticity
of domestic pollution, w.r.t. the domestic emissions tax is unambiguously smaller in the open
economy (in absolute terms). Hence, environmental policy is more effective under autarky.
We summarise these results as follows:
Proposition 5. A unilateral increase in the emissions tax by country i leads to a reduction
in foreign emissions through an internationally-transmitted change in the foreign wage rate. In
case of transboundary pollution this leads to negative emissions leakage. Relative to autarky, this
partial effect is dominated by the smaller reduction in domestic aggregate emissions. Accordingly,
a unilateral increase in the emissions tax reduces domestic pollution more effectively in the
absence of international trade.
5 Discussion
In this section, we briefly discuss two additional aspects of our model. First, we look at coor-
dinated policy reforms between the two countries. Second, we show how we can decompose the
overall effect of tax reform on aggregate emissions into a scale effect and a technique effect.
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5.1 Coordinated environmental policy reforms
In this section, we complement our analysis of unilateral reform of environmental taxation with a
discussion of the case of a coordinated environmental policy reform of the two trading partners.
To this end, suppose both countries changed their emissions taxes by the same percentage,
i.e. t̂i = t̂j = t̂. This is more general than, but includes, the case of an equal change in emissions
taxes (in levels) evaluated at a symmetric initial equilibrium.
By inspection of the system of equilibrium equations, a change in both emissions taxes of
equal size does neither affect any cutoff productivity level in the two countries nor does it change
the relative wage rate (which may still be different to unity as we allow for asymmetry). The
intuition is as follows. Since we have an equally strong increase in the emissions taxes in both
countries, the relative market attractiveness remains unchanged. Accordingly, we do not see a
reallocation of labour to, or from, exporting firms, and the average productivity is not affected
via the firm selection effect.
Moreover, we show in an Online Appendix that the elasticity of the domestic wage rate
w.r.t. the domestic emissions tax is equal to −(1−α)/α. This leads to an elasticity of domestic
aggregate emissions w.r.t. the domestic emissions tax equal to −1/α. Both elasticities are, hence,
independent of initial values of endogenous variables and equal for both countries, even in case
of initial asymmetry (changes in levels are not necessarily identical, of course). Moreover, these
are the same elasticities as in the closed economy setting. It is, hence, not the difference between
autarky and international trade that leads to the different impact of environmental policy. By
contrast, it is the difference between unilateral and coordinated environmental policy in the
open economy that has an impact on its effectiveness.
5.2 Decomposing aggregate emissions
There is a long tradition in the trade and environment literature to decompose the change in
aggregate emissions in response to a trade or environmental policy reform into different partial
effects (cf. Grossman and Krueger, 1993; Antweiler et al., 2001). This helps to better understand
the underlying mechanisms behind the net effect. Recent decomposition approaches focus on the
micro level using firm- and product-level data (Shapiro and Walker, 2018; Barrows and Ollivier,
2018; Cherniwchan et al., 2017).
In our framework, we can decompose aggregate emissions generated in country i based on
information of individual firm characteristics and on the equilibrium firm distribution. Accord-
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ingly,
Ei = Mi × ξi × l̄i × ϕ̄i × āi = Qi × āi, (40)
i.e. they are the product of total production Qi and average emission intensity of firms, where
the latter is defined as āi ≡
∫∞
ϕdi
ai(ϕ)[ydi (ϕ) + yxi (ϕ)]/ȳig(ϕ)/[1 − G(ϕdi )]dϕ. Total output, in
turn, is the product of the mass of firms, the share of variable labour used in production, the
average variable labour input, and the average productivity.15
Log-linearising Eq. (40), as shown in the Online Appendix, we can express the change in
total domestic emissions as follows
Êi = Q̂i + ˆ̄ai =
[
(1− α)
(
ŵi − t̂i
)
+ ˆ̄ϕi
]
+
{
α
(
ŵi − t̂i
)
− ˆ̄ϕi
}
.
It consists of two partial effects: the scale effect (in square brackets), which collects all terms
affecting aggregate emissions via a change in total production holding the emissions intensity
constant, and the technique effect (in curly brackets), which measures the change in the (output-
weighted) average emission intensity holding total production fixed.
Both the scale effect and the technique effect are determined by two channels: First, they are
affected by changes in the wage-tax ratio that determines allocation of labour between production
and emissions abatement. It, hence, corresponds to a within-firm reallocation effect.16 Second,
both effects are affected by a change in average productivity. This corresponds to an across-firms
reallocation effect.17 In our framework, the effect of average productivity on average emission
intensity cancels its effect on output, which is due to the fact that, as shown in Eq. (4), firm-level
emission intensity is inversely proportional to firm-level productivity. Hence, any reallocation of
labour towards more productive firms, say, which increases average productivity, has an equal
but opposite effect on average emission intensity. Hence, as shown above, only the within-firm
reallocation effect determines aggregate emissions.
In case of a unilateral increase in the emissions tax as discussed in Section 4 we find an
increase in average productivity in country i (see Proposition 2). Joint with the decline in the
wage-tax-ratio the technique effect is unambiguously negative, while the scale effect consists of
two opposing effects. We show, however, in the Online Appendix that the within-firm realloca-
15 While the decomposition is structurally equivalent in the open and closed economy, the different terms follow
different equilibrium conditions in the open economy, which we will focus on in what follows.
16 Alternatively, one may speak of a firm abatement effect (or ’pure’ technique effect) as is based on individual
firm decisions regarding emissions abatement.
17 While there is no composition effect present in the traditional sense (cf. Antweiler et al., 2001) as we model
only one sector, reallocation of labour across firms can be interpreted as intra-sectoral composition effect (cf.
Kreickemeier and Richter, 2014).
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tion effect dominates and the scale effect is negative in response to an increase in ti. Thus, both
partial effects contribute to the decline in domestic aggregate emissions.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyse the effects of a unilateral change in environmental policy in an open
economy, using a model in which the firm population is exogenously heterogeneous with respect
to firm productivity, and endogenously heterogeneous regarding firm-level emissions intensity,
with more productive firms being more environmentally efficient. Countries are asymmetric,
and due to fixed costs of exporting only the large, productive firms in both countries select into
exporting.
Aggregate productivity increases in the country that increases its emissions tax unilaterally
since productive exporting firms are less affected, in relative terms, by the tax-induced decrease
in the domestic market size, and as a result they become relatively larger, carrying more weight
in computing the average. By contrast, average productivity declines in the non-reforming
trading partner, as foreign exporters face the relative decline in market size of the reforming
country.
Through general equilibrium effects, wage rates in both countries are affected. This influ-
ences the efficiency of the unilateral environmental policy reform as it is the costs of emitting
relative to the costs of emissions abatement that determines aggregate emissions. Accordingly,
domestic emissions decline due to within-firm reallocation of labour towards emissions abate-
ment that is amplified by a reduced wage rate. However, we show that in the open economy
the elasticity of domestic aggregate emissions with respect to the domestic emissions tax is re-
duced relative to autarky. In this sense, unilateral environmental policy in our model is less
effective in the presence of international goods trade than under autarky. Importantly, we find
an internationally-transmitted decline in the foreign wage, which increases the tax-wage ratio
abroad and, hence, leads to enhanced abatement efforts of foreign firms. In case of transbound-
ary pollution this implies negative emissions leakage.
21
A Appendix
A.1 Environmental policy reform in the closed economy
A.1.1 Derivation of the mass of firms in Eq. (10)
Due to the properties of the assumed Pareto distribution, we can express average variable labour
input as a multiple of the variable labour input of the marginal firms scaling it by θ. Accordingly,
we can rewrite the full employment condition in Eq. (9) as
L = M
[
fe
(
ϕd
)k
+ f + θl(ϕd)
]
. (A.1)
From the revenues of the marginal firm it follows that y(ϕd) = σfw[p(ϕd)]−1. Using this
expression, the pricing rule, and the production technology, i.e. l(ϕ) = y(ϕ)/[ϕξ(ϕ)], we can
rewrite the full employment condition as:
L = M
[
fe
(
ϕd
)k
+ f
(
1 + θ(σ − 1)α
)]
(A.2)
Substituting the average profits condition, Eq. (5), for f gives
L = M
[
fe
(
ϕd
)k
+ π̄
w (θ − 1)
(
1 + θ(σ − 1)α
)]
(A.3)
Using the free entry condition, Eq. (6), to substitute for π̄/w gives
L = Mfe
(
ϕd
)k [
1 + 1 + θ(σ − 1)α
θ − 1
]
(A.4)
Finally, solving for M and simplifying by means of the definition of ζ gives Eq. (10) in the main
text.
A.1.2 Derivation of the change in the wage rate in Eq. (13)
The ideal CES price index is given by
P 1−σ =
∫ ∞
ϕd
M
[
p(ϕ)
]1−σ g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕd)dϕ. (A.5)
Using the specification of the Pareto distribution for productivities, this can be rewritten as
P 1−σ = Mθ
[
p(ϕd)
]1−σ
. (A.6)
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By means of the equilibrium outcome for M and p(ϕ) this can be specified as
P 1−σ = Lθ
ζkfe
(
βt1−αwα
ρ
)1−σ (
ϕd
)σ−1−k
. (A.7)
Log-linearising this term gives:
(1− σ)P̂ = (1− σ)
[
αŵ + (1− α)t̂
]
+ (σ − 1− k)ϕ̂d. (A.8)
Noting that P̂ = 0 by choice of the numéraire and ϕ̂d = 0, as from Eq. (7) ϕd is fixed by
parameters, we get Eq. (13) in the main text.
A.2 Open economy equilibrium
A.2.1 Derivation of the mass of firms in the open economy
The full employment condition for the open economy is given by
Li = Mi
fe (ϕdi )k + f + ∫ ∞
ϕd
ydi (ϕ)
ϕξ
g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕdi )
dϕ
+ χi
(
fx +
∫ ∞
ϕxi
yxi (ϕ)
ϕξ
g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕxi )
dϕ
). (A.9)
By means of our specification of the Pareto distribution and of both zero cutoff profit con-
ditions for country i from Eq. (14), we can rewrite the full employment condition as
Li = Mi
[
fe
(
ϕdi
)k
+ (f + χifx)
(
1 + θ(σ − 1)α
)]
. (A.10)
Substituting Eq. (16) for (f + χifx), we get the same reduced equation as for the closed
economy, Eq. (A.3). Since the free entry condition, Eq. (6), is unchanged, the mass of active
domestic firms in the open economy is derived as in Eq. (10) as postulated in the main text.
A.3 Unilateral environmental policy reform
A.3.1 Equilibrium relations and the log-linearised system of equations
We derive the system of six generic equilibrium conditions as follows.
First, by means of the free entry condition and average firm profits we show in Eq. (17) a
relation between the two cutoff productivity levels of country i, ϕdi and ϕxi .
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Second, dividing the zero cutoff profit condition for foreign exporters to enter country i, by
the zero cutoff profit condition for domestic firms to enter the same market, both from Eq. (14),
we get an expression of the marginal domestic productivity level that depends on the relative
wage rates, on relative emissions taxes, and as on the foreign export cutoff:
ϕdi =
 1
τσi
(
wi
wj
)[1+α(σ−1)](
ti
tj
)[(1−α)(σ−1)]
f
fx
 1σ−1 ϕxj . (A.11)
Third, making use of the trade balance condition, Eq. (18), simplified by average revenues,
r̄di = θσwif and r̄xi = θσwifx, by average profits from Eq. (16), and by the mass of firms from
Eq. (10), we get
ϕxi =
(
Li
Lj
wi
wj
) 1
k
ϕxj . (A.12)
Finally, we make use of the domestic price index. Recall that for the open economy the do-
mestic price index is a weighted average of individual prices from domestic and foreign suppliers.
Accordingly,
P 1−σi =
∫ ∞
ϕdi
Mi
(
βwαi t
1−α
i
ρϕ
)1−σ
g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕdi )
dϕ+
∫ ∞
ϕxj
χjMj
τiβwαj t1−αj
ρϕ
1−σ g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕxj )
dϕ
= θMi
(
βwαi t
1−α
i
ρϕdi
)1−σ
+ θχjMj
τiβwαj t1−αj
ρϕxj
1−σ , (A.13)
where the second line directly follows from the specified Pareto distribution. Using the definitions
of the mass of domestic and exporting firms given in Eq. (10) this can be rewritten as
P 1−σi =
θ
ζkfe
(
β
ρ
)1−σ [
Li
(
wαi t
1−α
i
)1−σ (
ϕdi
)σ−1−k
+ Lj
(
τiw
α
j t
1−α
j
)1−σ (
ϕxj
)σ−1−k]
. (A.14)
Note that Pi is fixed due to our choice of the numéraire. Then Eqs. (17) and (A.11), and their
respective analogues for country j, and Eqs. (A.12) and (A.14) jointly give a system of six
equations in the six unknowns. This constitutes the open economy equilibrium.
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Log-linearising these six equations as shown in the Online Appendix yields
ϕ̂di = −f̃xχiϕ̂xi (A.15)
ϕ̂dj = −f̃xχjϕ̂xj (A.16)
ϕ̂xj = ϕ̂di − ζ
(
ŵi − ŵj
)
− (1− α)
(
t̂i − t̂j
)
+ 1
ρ
τ̂i (A.17)
ϕ̂xi = ϕ̂dj + ζ
(
ŵi − ŵj
)
+ (1− α)
(
t̂i − t̂j
)
+ 1
ρ
τ̂j (A.18)
ϕ̂xi = ϕ̂xj +
1
k
(
ŵi − ŵj
)
(A.19)
P̂i = δ̃i
[
αŵi + (1− α)t̂i +
k − (σ − 1)
σ − 1 ϕ̂
d
i
]
+
(
1− δ̃i
) [
τ̂i + αŵj + (1− α)t̂j +
k − (σ − 1)
σ − 1 ϕ̂
x
j
]
. (A.20)
Reducing this system of equations according to our analysis gives Eqs. (23)-(28) in the main
text.
A.3.2 Derivation of the change in the domestic export cutoff, Eq. (30)
As a first step, in Eqs. (A.17)-(A.19) substitute for the domestic cutoff productivities, ϕ̂di and
ϕ̂dj , from Eqs. (A.15) and (A.16). This gives a reduced system of three equations in the four
unknowns ϕ̂xi , ϕ̂xj , ŵi, and ŵj , while the latter two variables are part of each equation as the
change in the relative domestic wage rate:
ϕ̂xj = −f̃xχiϕ̂xi − ζ
(
ŵi − ŵj
)
− (1− α)
(
t̂i − t̂j
)
+ 1
ρ
τ̂i (A.21)
ϕ̂xi = −f̃xχjϕ̂xj + ζ
(
ŵi − ŵj
)
+ (1− α)
(
t̂i − t̂j
)
+ 1
ρ
τ̂j (A.22)
ϕ̂xi = ϕ̂xj +
1
k
(
ŵi − ŵj
)
(A.23)
Make use of Eq. (A.23) to substitute for ϕ̂xj in Eqs. (A.21) and (A.22). This yields
(
1 + f̃xχi
)
ϕ̂xi = −
(
ζ − 1
k
) (
ŵi − ŵj
)
− (1− α)
(
t̂i − t̂j
)
+ 1
ρ
τ̂i (A.24)(
1 + f̃xχj
)
ϕ̂xi =
(
ζ + f̃
xχj
k
)(
ŵi − ŵj
)
+ (1− α)
(
t̂i − t̂j
)
+ 1
ρ
τ̂j (A.25)
Jointly, by eliminating the change in relative wage rates, ŵi−ŵj , this gives the final equation
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relating a change in the domestic export cutoff to changes in exogenously altered policy changes:
ϕ̂xi =
−(1− α)1 + f̃xχj
k
(
t̂i − t̂j
)
+
(
ζ + f̃
xχj
k
)
1
ρ
τ̂i +
(
ζ − 1
k
) 1
ρ
τ̂j
A−1, (A.26)
where we define
A ≡
(
1 + f̃xχj
)(
ζ − 1
k
)
+
(
1 + f̃xχi
)(
ζ + f̃
xχj
k
)
=
[
2 + f̃x
(
χi + χj
)]
ζ −
[
1−
(
f̃x
)2
χiχj
] 1
k
> 0. (A.27)
From ζ > 1/k it follows that A > 0, which symmetrically depends on the domestic and foreign
variables, χi and χj .
The effect of a change in ti on ϕxi can be expressed as follows
ϕ̂xi
t̂i
= −(1− α)
[
(ζk − 1) +
(
1 + f̃xχi
) ζk + f̃xχj
1 + f̃xχj
]−1
∈
(
−σ − 1
k
; 0
)
. (A.28)
The negative elasticity is strictly smaller than unity (in absolute value). To see this, note that
ζk > 1 and, hence, the term in square brackets is strictly larger than one, while (1−α) ∈ (0; 1).
A.3.3 Derivation of aggregate productivity and its change, Eqs. (32) and (33)
From the definition of average productivity it follows that
ϕ̄i =
[∫ ∞
ϕdi
ϕ−1ydi (ϕ)
g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕdi )
dϕ+
∫ ∞
ϕxi
ϕ−1yxi (ϕ)
g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕdi )
dϕ
]−1
ȳi
=
[
k(σ − 1)
k − (σ − 1)
(
wi
ti
)1−α 1
β
(
ϕdi
)k (
f
(
ϕdi
)−k
+ fx
(
ϕxi
)−k)]−1
ȳi, (A.29)
where the second equality follows from the specification of the Pareto distribution for productiv-
ities and from the two zero cutoff profit conditions for country i as defined as in Eq. (14). Using
ȳi ≡ ȳdi +χiȳxi = k(σ− 1)/[β(k− σ)]
(
wi/ti
)1−α (
ϕdi
)k [
f
(
ϕdi
)1−k
+ fx
(
ϕxi
)1−k] this reduces to
ϕ̄i =
k − (σ − 1)
(k − σ)
f
(
ϕdi
)1−k
+ fx
(
ϕxi
)1−k
f
(
ϕdi
)−k
+ fx
(
ϕxi
)−k , (A.30)
which, rearranged, gives Eq. (32) in the main text.
An alternative expression can be derived by means of Eq. (17) taking into account the relation
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between the two domestic cutoff productivity levels. Accordingly, average productivity follows
as
ϕ̄i =
σ − 1
(k − σ)fe
[
f
(
ϕdi
)1−k
+ fx
(
ϕxi
)1−k]
. (A.31)
Log-linearising this equation yields
ˆ̄ϕi = −(k − 1)
[
ψiϕ̂
d
i + (1− ψi) ϕ̂xi
]
, (A.32)
where we define ψi ≡ 1/
(
1 + f̃xχ
k−1
k
)
, which can be shown to be the (initial) share of produc-
tion for the domestic market in total production; 1 − ψi to be the (initial) share of production
for the export market. Substituting for ϕ̂xi from Eq. (23) and rearranging terms, we derive the
change in aggregate productivity w.r.t. the change in the emissions tax as given as in Eq. (33).
A.3.4 Derivation of the change in the foreign export cutoff, Eq. (34)
Similar to the derivation of the change in the domestic export cutoff, we start by eliminating the
other country’s change in its export cutoff in the reduced system of equations. Here substitute
for ϕ̂xi in Eqs. (A.21) and (A.22) by means of Eq. (A.23) in order to get:
(
1 + f̃xχi
)
ϕ̂xj = −
(
ζ + f̃
xχi
k
)(
ŵi − ŵj
)
− (1− α)
(
t̂i − t̂j
)
+ 1
ρ
τ̂i (A.33)(
1 + f̃xχj
)
ϕ̂xj =
(
ζ − 1
k
) (
ŵi − ŵj
)
+ (1− α)
(
t̂i − t̂j
)
+ 1
ρ
τ̂j . (A.34)
Jointly, by eliminating ŵi − ŵj , these two equations can be reduced to
ϕ̂xj =
(1− α)1 + f̃xχi
k
(
t̂i − t̂j
)
+
(
ζ − 1
k
) 1
ρ
τ̂i +
(
ζ + f̃
xχi
k
)
1
ρ
τ̂j
A−1. (A.35)
Solving for ϕ̂xj /t̂i gives Eq.(34) in the main text.
A.3.5 Derivation of the change in the domestic wage rate, Eq. (36)
Substituting for ϕ̂di in Eq. (A.20) from Eq. (A.15) and rearranging gives:
P̂i = αŵi + (1− α)t̂i − f̃xχi
k − (σ − 1)
σ − 1 ϕ̂
x
i
+ (1− δ̃i)
[
τ̂i − α
(
ŵi − ŵj
)
− (1− α)
(
t̂i − t̂j
)
+ k − (σ − 1)
σ − 1
(
ϕ̂xj + f̃xχiϕ̂xi
)]
, (A.36)
where δ̃i is defined as in Eq. (29).
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Next, make use of Eq. (A.23) to substitute for ϕ̂xj in Eq. (A.36). Accordingly,
P̂i = αŵi + (1− α)t̂i +
k − (σ − 1)
σ − 1
[
1− δ̃i
(
1 + f̃xχi
)]
ϕ̂xi
+ (1− δ̃i)
[
τ̂i −
(
ζ − 1
k
) (
ŵi − ŵj
)
− (1− α)
(
t̂i − t̂j
)]
, (A.37)
where we make use of the relation α+ [k− (σ− 1)]/[k(σ− 1)] = ζ − 1/k, which directly follows
from the definition of ζ. Next, eliminate ŵi − ŵj by means of Eq. (A.24). This gives:
P̂i = αŵi + (1− α)t̂i −
(1− δ̃i)
σ − 1 τ̂i +
[
f̃xχi +
k
σ − 1
(
1− δ̃i(1 + f̃xχi)
)]
ϕ̂xi . (A.38)
Recalling that δ̃i =
(
1 + τif̃xχi
)−1
from Eq. (29) we can rewrite Eq. (A.38) as:
P̂i = αŵi + (1− α)t̂i −
τif̃
xχi
1 + τif̃xχi
(σ − 1)−1τ̂i +
f̃xχi + k
σ − 1
{
1− 1 + f̃
xχi
1 + τif̃xχi
} ϕ̂xi . (A.39)
Finally, setting P̂i = 0 (by choice of the numéraire) and τ̂i = 0 (by choice of the analysis), we
get
ŵi
t̂i
= −1− α
α
− 1
α
f̃xχi + k
σ − 1
{
1− 1 + f̃
xχi
1 + τif̃xχi
} ϕ̂xi
t̂i
. (A.40)
The sign of the overall effect is ex ante ambiguous as it consists of two opposing effects. On the
one hand, there is a negative direct effect of the change in ti (via the price index). This effect
is the same as in the closed economy. On the other hand, there is an additional, indirect effect
through reallocation represented by the change in the export cutoff. This second effect is larger
than zero. This follows as ϕ̂xi /t̂i < 0, while the term in square brackets is positive. To see this,
note that the term in curly brackets is ∈ [0; 1), while it becomes zero in the absence of an initial
(domestic) import tariff, i.e. if τi = 1. We can rewrite Eq. (A.40) using Eq. (30) to substitute
for ϕ̂xi /t̂i and get Eq. (36) in the main text
In order to proof the negative sign of the effect, rewrite Eq. (36) to get:
ŵi
t̂i
= −1− α
αAk
Ak − (1 + f̃xχj)
f̃xχi + k
σ − 1
{
1− 1 + f̃
xχi
1 + τif̃xχi
}
 . (A.41)
Since (1 − α)/α and Ak are both positive, it is sufficient to determine the sign of the term in
parentheses to learn about the sign of the entire effect. Using the definition of A and noting
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that ζ = α+ 1/(σ − 1), it is straightforward to rewrite the term in parentheses as
Ci ≡
(
1 + f̃xχi
)
(ζk − 1) +
(
1 + f̃xχj
)(
αk + k
σ − 1
1 + f̃xχi
1 + τif̃xχi
)
∈ (0;Ak), (A.42)
which is strictly positive since all terms in parentheses are greater than zero as ζk > 1. Moreover,
note that this positive term is necessarily smaller than Ak. Hence, dividing it by Ak gives a
term ∈ (0; 1) as proposed in the main text.
A.3.6 Derivation of the change in the foreign wage rate
In order to derive the change in the foreign wage rate, make use of Eqs. (A.21)-(A.23) and
eliminate the export cutoff productivity levels of both countries to get an expression for the
change in the relative wage rate, ŵj − ŵi. Accordingly,
ŵj − ŵi =
(1− α) [2 + f̃x (χi + χj)] (t̂i − t̂j)− (1 + f̃xχj) 1
ρ
τ̂i
+
(
1 + f̃xχi
) 1
ρ
τ̂j
A−1. (A.43)
Setting t̂j = τ̂i = τ̂j = 0 by choice of our analysis and rearranging gives Eq. (38) in the main
text. The positive sign directly follows from the definition of A > 0.
By means of Eq. (36) for ŵi/t̂i, we can derive the elasticity of the foreign wage rate w.r.t. the
domestic emissions tax as
ŵj
t̂i
= −1− α
αAk
(
Ci −
[
2 + f̃x
(
χi + χj
)]
αk
)
. (A.44)
Since both (1 − α)/α and Ak are positive, it is sufficient to determine the sign of the term in
parentheses to learn about the sign of the entire effect. Using the definition of Ci from Eq. (A.42)
and and noting that ζk = αk+ k/(σ− 1), we can show that the term in parentheses is equal to
(
1 + f̃xχi
)( k
σ − 1 − 1
)
+
(
1 + f̃xχj
) k
σ − 1
(
1 + f̃xχi
1 + τif̃xχi
)
∈ (0; Ci), (A.45)
which is strictly positive, since all terms are greater than zero as k > σ− 1, and strictly smaller
than Ci.
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